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Abstract 
There is available an ever-increasing vari­
ety of procedures for managing uncertainty. 
These methods are discussed in the literature 
of artificial intelligence, as well as in the lit­
erature of philosophy of science. Heretofore 
these methods have been evaluated by intu­
ition, discussion, and the general philosoph­
ical method of argument and counterexam­
ple. Almost any method of uncertainty man­
agement will have the property that in the 
long run it will deliver numbers approaching 
the relative frequency of the kinds of events 
at issue. To find a measure that will pro­
vide a meaningful evaluation of these treat­
ments of uncertainty, we must look, not at 
the long run, but at the short or intermediate 
run. Our project attempts to develop such 
a measure in terms of short or intermediate 
length performance. We represent the effects 
of practical choices by the outcomes of bets 
offered to agents characterized by two un­
certainty management approaches: the sub­
jective Bayesian approach and the Classical 
confidence interval approach. Experimental 
evaluation suggests that the confidence inter­
val approach can outperform the subjective 
approach in the relatively short run. 
1 Introduction 
Probability is the very guide of life, said Bishop But­
ler, and many agree. But what that comes to depends 
on what you mean by "probability". In the past there 
have been several clearcut interpretations of probabil­
ity to choose from: The subjective Bayesian view, ac­
cording to which a probability represents an individ­
ual's actual or idealised degree of belief [Savage, 1954], 
the logical view, according to which the probability of 
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a statement, relative to a body of evidence, represents 
something like partial entailment, and is a relation be­
tween the evidence an individual has and that state­
ment (Carnap, 1950], and the empirical view which in­
cludes as variants finite frequency [Russell, 1901], lim­
iting frequency [Mises, 1957), and measure-theoretic 
[Cramer, 1951) views according to which a probability 
statement is a claim about the world of the same gen­
eral character as a universal generalization or a law. 
In recent years this neat trichotomy has become less 
sharp. Many writers seem to have decided that vague­
ness is the better part of· valor: One may assign 
probabilities to statements without specifying where 
the assignment comes from or what it comes to -
whether the source is logical measure or intuitive be­
lief, whether it is intended to be representational or 
normative. 
From the point of view of the pure logician, this makes 
perfect sense: just as logic is not (in general) concerned 
to tell us what statements are true, but rather to spell 
out relations among truth assignments, so probabilis­
tic logic need not be concerned with the probability as­
signed to any particular statement, but only with the 
relations of probabilities assigned to statements in re­
lated groups - for example, an algebra of statements. 
There is thus a reasonable precedent for leaving the 
problem of interpreting probability to someone else. 
2 There is an Issue 
Despite the atmosphere of tolerance and good will (or 
perhaps fatigue) that currently surrounds questions of 
the interpretation of probability, there are important 
issues to be discussed, and perhaps even resolved. The 
issues are important because probability (or some mea­
sure of uncertainty) is central in decision making under 
the only circumstances we have access to. 
There is no extrasystematic way of determining 
whether the probability assigned to a statement ( "Pe-
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ter's bike will not be stolen," "Susan's toss will land 
tails") is "correct" or not. By this we mean that the 
truth or falsity of the statement in question ("The bike 
is stolen," "The coin lands tails") cannot confirm or 
refute the probability we have assigned to it. The im­
probable happens (my bridge hand may consist of thir­
teen cards of the same suit) and what is almost cer­
tain to occur may not occur (a large fair sample may 
turn out to be totally misleading). Of course within 
some system we can confirm or refute the assignment 
of probabilities: the subjective Bayesian can examine 
his (or your) sincere propensity to bet; the logical the­
orist can compute the measures of the relevant mod­
els. However, any statement is either true in our one 
world, or false in it, and that is the end of the matter. 
The truth or falsity of the single statement gives us 
no handle on its probability, no way of evaluating the 
probability claim. 
A natural response is to say that while the truth or fal­
sity of a single statement says nothing about its prob­
ability, yet in the long run the relative frequency of 
truth in a class of statements of probability p ought 
to come close to p. But the connection between long 
run relative frequency of truth and probability is it­
self a probabilistic connection: we should expect that 
sometimes the highly probable turns out to be false. 
The only way to make this connection tight is to 
adopt a frequency interpretation of probability, and 
that breaks the very connection we need: probability 
no longer applies to the single case. 
What we are looking for is a way to evaluate the differ­
ent approaches to uncertainty that is more convincing 
than calling on conflicting intuitions. These would in­
clude not only different interpretations of probability, 
but also so-called non-probabilistic approaches such as 
Dempster/Shafer belief functions [Shafer, 1976] and 
possibility theory [Dubois and Prade, 1992]. 
Here we will concentrate on comparing the subjective 
Bayesian approach and the classical confidence interval 
approach to probability. 
Confidence methods bridge the gap between frequen­
cies and probabilities of particular cases by allowing us 
to accept (or to "fail to reject" ) , at a certain level of 
confidence, statistical hypotheses that impose interval 
constraints on long run frequencies. 1 The agent ac­
cepts that the long run relative frequency lies between 
an upper and a lower bound. The confidence level 
represents practical certainty: one minus the chance 
of being wrong we are just willing to tolerate. 
The subjective Bayesian approach eschews acceptance, 
yielding only probability distributions over hypothe-
1 More general procedures, based on imprecise probabil­
ities, are discussed by Peter Walley [Walley, 1995]. 
ses. But when it comes to specific events, it yields 
point-valued probabilities, and thus the principle of 
maximizing expectation is always applicable. 
3 Comparing the Performance 
A natural idea is to consider, not one statement, but 
many. In the simplest case, we might look at a 
sequence of trials, to which alternative conceptions 
of probability may be applied. In the long run we 
have no test that compares the sensible (non-extreme) 
Bayesian to the probabilist who bases his probabili­
ties on confidence limits at a given level of confidence. 
For a fixed confidence level, as we consider more tri­
als in the sequence, an ever narrower confidence in­
terval can, at that fixed level of confidence, be taken 
to characterize the sequence. The non-extreme sub­
jective Bayesian will have beliefs that converge to the 
same long run relative frequency approached by the 
progressively narrower confidence intervals. 
Thus, "in the long run" there is no difference between 
the two approaches. Presumably this is also true of 
any sensible alternative view - a view of probability 
that did not lead to convergence towards an observed 
frequency in a sequence of this sort in the long run 
would surely be strange. 
This is however not true of the short run. What we 
examine is whether the frequency-based probabilist is 
better off than the subjective Bayesian or vice versa 
in the short run.2 Although we know that they will 
come close to agreement in the long run, there may be 
a statistically significant difference in favor of one or 
the other in the short run. 
One way to get at this is to have proponents of the 
two views bet with each other on a sequence of trials 
of an event with an unknown probability of success.3 
Each would represent and update its own beliefs with 
respect to the interpretation of probability it adheres 
to, and place bets on the success of the trials accord­
ingly. The profit or loss from the bets on a (not very 
long) sequence of trials can then serve as an indicator 
of how well a particular approach works. 
4 Rules of the Game 
In this section we describe the set up of the game we 
used to evaluate the performance of the Bayesian and 
2The confidence theorist does not need a very long run 
to get going: at a confidence of 0. 75 he can be confident 
that in a sample of two the sample ratio will differ by no 
more than 1/3 from the unknown parameter p. 
3This was first suggested by Murtezaoglu in his disser­
tation [M urtezaogl u, 1998]. 
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Action 
buy 
sell 
hold 
Outcome 
heads tails 
1-t -t 
-(1 - t) t 
0 0 
Table 1: Payoffs of a trial with ticket price $t 
confidence interval approaches. Let us call the two 
players Bayes, an adherent of subjective Bayesianism, 
and Conf, an adherent of classical confidence methods. 
The game consists of a sequence of tosses of a (possi­
bly biased) coin, whose chance of turning up heads is 
p. The two agents bet on the outcomes of the tosses 
according to their own estimates of the probability of 
heads. Before each toss, a random price $t between 
$0 and $1 is posted as the price of a ticket that will 
return $1 if the next toss is heads, and nothing oth­
erwise. We make a market in those tickets: that is, 
we are willing to buy or sell any number of tickets at 
price $t. A new randomly generated price is adopted 
for each new trial. 
Given the ticket price $t for a trial, Bayes and Conf 
each has three options: buy a ticket at price $t, sell a 
ticket at price $(1- t), or hold (decline to participate 
in this trial). The payoffs are given in Table 1. 
4.1 Belief Representation 
The two players represent their beliefs differently. 
Bayes represents its belief by a beta distribution, 
which is a commonly assumed subjectivist distribu­
tion and one that is easy to update. Conf represents 
its belief by a confidence interval at confidence level 
1 - a. At the start of the game, neither of the agents 
has any information about the coin. Bayes starts with 
a prior distribution beta( a, b). (A flat prior distribu­
tion in which every value of p is equally likely is given 
by beta(1, 1)). Conf on the other hand represents to­
tal ignorance by the widest interval possible; that is, 
[0, 1]. Its initial state of belief may also be thought 
of as accepting as possible the whole set of Bernoulli 
distributions. 
As more evidence comes in, in the form of outcomes of 
previous coin tosses in the sequence of trials, the two 
agents each update their beliefs in heads according to 
their own scheme. Bayes changes its belief to beta( a+ 
h, b + h), where h and h. are the numbers of heads 
and tails observed so far. Conf derives the interval at 
confidence 1 - a based on h and t, such that 1 -a of 
the time the real probability p falls within this interval. 
It rejects the Bernoulli distributions with values of p 
falling outside this interval. 
4.2 Betting Strategy 
Given a ticket price of $t, and a mean x of the current 
beta distribution, Bayes buys a ticket if t � x, and 
sells a ticket otherwise. Conf with confidence interval 
[l, u] buys a ticket if t < l, sells a ticket if t > u, 
and declines to bet if t falls within the bounds of the 
interval. 
It is not clear what the fairest procedure is. Bayes 
always has an exact probability, and so can always 
choose a bet with the maximum expectation. On the 
other hand, Conf is almost sure to start the sequence 
by declining all bets, until it has accumulated some 
knowledge of the distribution. We have chosen to take 
account of this by allowing each player to bet no more 
than m times on the n tosses. 
For each trial, each has to decide whether to use a 
token or not on the spot, and once we have moved on 
to the next toss, they cannot change their minds about 
decisions made for the previous tosses and go back 
to bet on a previously declined trial. This eliminates 
strategies that require global planning or lookahead, 
such as choosing the m trials whose ticket prices are 
the most extreme among the n trials. 
This presents an added complication for Bayes: Bayes 
must decide, on each toss, whether to bet on that toss 
or to save its bet until later when it (presumably) has 
a "better" posterior probability on which to base its 
bet. Conf follows a simpler algorithm, but faces the 
prospect of not being able to use all of its m bets. 
To simplify matters we have supposed that Bayes will 
bet on the last m of the n opportunities to bet, and 
that Conf will simply bet whenever it reasonably can. 
To compensate for these difficulties we have varied the 
number of bets m as a fraction of the number of op­
portunities n. 
5 Preliminary Evaluation 
We set up the game using the following parameters. 
100 runs were performed with each combination of pa­
rameter values. 
Chance of heads p: {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9} 
Length of the binomial sequence of trials n: 
{3, 5, 10,20, 30, 50} 
Number of tokens m: {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 1.0} of the 
number of trials n 
Confidence level 1 - a: 
{0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 0.95, 0.99} 
(or a E { 0.5, 0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1, 0.05, 0.01}) 
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Priors (beta( a, b)): 
{(1, 1), (1, k + 1), (k + 1, 1), (k + 1, k + 1)}, 
for k E {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 1.0} of the number of 
trials n 
Confidence levels are traditionally chosen in the range 
0.90 to 0.99. On the other hand, they are perfectly 
well defined for any parameter greater than 0.50. Low 
confidence may not seem like much, but if it repre­
sents "more likely than not", and is based on objec­
tive facts about the world, it becomes more interesting. 
Note also that confidence methods can yield substan­
tive conclusions from even small samples. 
Note that under the rules of the game, the long run 
relative frequency of heads p is not a global parameter 
we set, but rather one the agents are trying to get a 
good estimate of. We have included it as a parameter 
in the evaluation however, to see how the performance 
changes with respect to the target relative frequency. 
Results are given broken down by individual p values 
as well as averaged over all settings of p. 
The net profits per allowed bet averaged over 100 runs 
are summarized in Tables 2 to 5. Due to the large nuzn.. 
her of combinations of parameters, we present only a 
cross section of results in each table with some of the 
parameters fixed, to give an idea of how the net profit 
varies with a particular parameter. Table 2 gives the 
results obtained from different numbers of trials n. Ta­
ble 3 reports on the effect of changes in the number 
of tokens m. Tables 4 and 5 show respectively how 
the net profit of Conf varied with the confidence level 
1 -a, and how the net profit of Bayes varied with the 
priors given by the beta distribution beta( a, b). 
For comparison, we also included the results obtained 
using the sample proportion (Sample) as the estimate. 
Sample buys a ticket at price $tift::; h/(h+h), where 
h and h are the numbers of heads and tails observed so 
far; otherwise it sells a ticket. Just as for the other two 
players, it is constrained by the maximum number of 
bets m it can place. The betting strategy of Sample is 
the same as that of Bayes. It bets on the last m trials 
of the sequence, as it should by then have a better 
estimate of the probability of heads. 
Note that Sample and Bayes always place the maxi­
mum allowable number of bets, while Conf might not. 
The profit however was averaged over the maximum 
allowable number (m), not the actual number of bets 
placed.4 
41f we consider the profit per actual number of bets 
placed, Con[ scored substantially better than the other 
two agents. 
p n I Sample Bayes Conf 
0.1 3 0.2664 0.2981 0.0345 
5 0.3478 0.3717 0.1711 
10 0.4021 0.4001 0.3433 
20 0.3952 0.3939 0.4904 
30 0.4092 0.4090 0.5491 
50 0.3980 0.4002 0.5395 
0.3 3 0.1102 0.2549 0.0470 
5 0.1925 0.2401 0.0671 
10 0.2635 0.2932 0.1920 
20 0.3005 0.2913 0.3320 
30 0.2729 0.2742 0.3633 
50 0.2888 0.2923 0.3916 
0.5 3 0.0799 0.2325 0.0698 
5 0.1595 0.2024 0.1147 
10 0.2317 0.2536 0.1759 
20 0.2574 0.2538 0.2653 
30 0.2352 0.2377 0.3017 
50 0.2491 0.2491 0.3390 
0.7 3 0.1985 0.2991 0.0744 
5 0.2889 0.2916 0.2172 
10 0.2442 0.2658 0.2680 
20 0.2447 0.2529 0.3355 
30 0.2781 0.2757 0.4002 
50 0.2961 0.2962 0.4038 
0.9 3 0.3831 0.3746 0.1103 
5 0.4287 0.4161 0.3588 
10 0.3787 0.3610 0.4636 
20 0.4017 0.4016 0.5437 
30 0.3966 0.3909 0.5533 
50 0.4121 0.4108 0.5467 
Overall 3 0.2076 0.2918 0.0672 
5 0.2835 0.3044 0.1858 
10 0.3040 0.3147 0.2886 
20 0.3199 0.3187 0.3934 
30 0.3184 0.3175 0.4335 
50 0.3288 0.3297 0.4441 
Table 2: Net profit per allowed bet, varying the num­
ber of trials n (m = 0.5n, a= 0.1, priors=beta(1, 1)). 
6 Discussion 
Let us examine the effects of varying the parameters of 
the experiments. First note that the net profits were 
positive in all cases, so all three methods of updating 
and betting have the right idea. The question is how 
right they are. 
The net profit was higher in almost all settings when 
the chance p of heads of the coin was more towards 
the two ends of the spectrum ( 0 and 1). The mid­
point p = 0.5 gave the lowest yields. But of course the 
agents are not in control of this parameter. In fact, 
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p m I Sample Bayes Conf 
0.1 2 0.3689 0.3795 0.6567 
6 0.4021 0.4055 0.5973 
10 0.3952 0.3939 0.4904 
14 0.3961 0.3931 0.3623 
20 0.3762 0.3743 0.2536 
0.3 2 0.2995 0.2995 0.5003 
6 0.3205 0.3123 0.4344 
10 0.3005 0.2913 0.3320 
14 0.2928 0.2886 0.2381 
20 0.2649 0.2751 0.1667 
0.5 2 0.2221 0.2069 0.4082 
6 0.2565 0.2512 0.3509 
10 0.2574 0.2538 0.2653 
14 0.2409 0.2388 0.1919 
20 0.2143 0.2325 0.1343 
0.7 2 0.2281 0.2412 0.4473 
6 0.2463 0.2543 0.4069 
10 0.2447 0.2529 0.3355 
14 0.2461 0.2545 0.2489 
20 0.2375 0.2553 0.1741 
0.9 2 0.4396 0.4316 0.6558 
6 0.3992 0.4021 0.6081 
10 0.4017 0.4016 0.5437 
14 0.3989 0.3963 0.4371 
20 0.3864 0.3831 0.3067 
Overall 2 0.3116 0.3117 0.5337 
6 0.3249 0.3251 0.4795 
10 0.3199 0.3187 0.3934 
14 0.3150 0.3143 0.2957 
20 0.2959 0.3041 0.2071 
Table 3: Net profit per allowed bet, varying the num­
ber of tokens m (n == 20, a== 0.1, priors==beta(1, 1)). 
they do not even know its value; otherwise they would 
not be applying various methods to update their be­
liefs about p. The entries under "Overall" in Tables 2 
to 5 show the net profits per allowed bet averaged over 
all settings of p, giving an indication of the overall per­
formance of the agents across a wide range of chance 
of heads. 
In the very short run (n = 3, Table 2), the net prof­
its were low for all three players, but they increased 
with the length of the run n, very quickly at the be­
ginning and then slower (and possibly flattened out) 
when n became large. Conf started out much lower 
than Bayes and Sample, but overtook them both as 
n was increased to the 10-20 range. We can expect 
that Conf does not bet much at the beginning, when 
its confidence interval is close to [0, 1] . An initial (not 
very long) sequence is needed to successively refine its 
interval estimate before bets can be placed effectively. 
p 1 - a I Sample Bayes Conf 
0.1 0.5 0.3952 0.3939 0.5095 
0.6 0.5114 
0.7 0.5074 
0.8 0.5093 
0.9 0.4904 
0.95 0.4692 
0.99 0.4039 
0.3 0.5 0.3005 0.2913 0.3509 
0.6 0.3545 
0.7 0.3608 
0.8 0.3559 
0.9 0.3320 
0.95 0.3048 
0.99 0.2457 
0.5 0.5 0.2574 0.2538 0.3027 
0.6 0.3016 
0.7 0.3016 
0.8 0.2923 
0.9 0.2653 
0.95 0.2359 
0.99 0.1875 
0.7 0.5 0.2447 0.2529 0.3521 
0.6 0.3517 
0.7 0.3480 
0.8 0.3474 
0.9 0.3355 
0.95 0.3056 
0.99 0.2702 
0.9 0.5 0.4017 0.4016 0.5252 
0.6 0.5386 
0.7 0.5455 
0.8 0.5442 
0.9 0.5437 
0.95 0.5322 
0.99 0.4965 
Overall 0.5 0.3199 0.3187 0.4081 
0.6 0.4116 
0.7 0.4127 
0.8 0.4098 
0.9 0.3934 
0.95 0.3695 
0.99 0.3208 
Table 4: Net profit per allowed bet, varying the level of 
confidence 1 - a  (n = 20, m = 10, priors=beta(1, 1)). 
Note that the results for Sample and Bayes do not 
vary with the level of confidence, and duplicate entries 
have been omitted. 
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p (a, b) / Sample Bayes Conf 
0.1 (1, 1) 0.3952 0.3939 0.4904 
(11,1) 0.2475 
(1,11) 0.4104 
(11,11) 0.3422 
0.3 (1,1) 0.3005 0.2913 0.3320 
(11,1) 0.2139 
(1,11) 0.3034 
(11,11) 0.2928 
0.5 (1,1) 0.2574 0.2538 0.2653 
(11,1) 0.2035 
(1,11) 0.2197 
(11,11) 0.2544 
0.7 (1,1) 0.2447 0.2529 0.3355 
(11,1) 0.2471 
(1,11) 0.2106 
(11,11) 0.2654 
0.9 (1,1) 0.4017 0.4016 0.5437 
(11,1) 0.4055 
(1, 11) 0.2663 
(11,11) 0.3610 
Overall (1,1) 0.3199 0.3187 0.3934 
(11,1) 0.2635 
(1,11) 0.2821 
(11,11) 0.3032 
Table 5: Net profit per allowed bet, varying the pri­
ors given by the beta distribution beta( a, b) ( n = 20, 
m = 10, a = 0.1). Note that the results for Sample 
and Conf do not vary with the beta distribution, and 
duplicate entries have been omitted. 
Now consider the effect of varying the limit m, the 
maximum number of bets placed (Table 3). Sam­
ple and Bayes were not affected very much by rn, 
but Conf's performance decreased drastically as rn in­
creased. For Conf, not every trial is safe to bet on, 
and thus at higher m's, it might not encounter enough 
"good" trials it is willing to place a bet on. However, 
since each bet it undertakes is likely to be of good 
value, the average return per bet would be higher, giv­
ing it an advantage over the other two players when rn 
is small. 
The other two parameters we considered do not ap­
ply to every agent. The level of confidence 1 - a is 
specific to Conf, and has no effect on Sample and 
Bayes. From Table 4, we see that the net profit for 
Conf decreased as the level of confidence increased. 
This effect again can be attributed to the number of 
bets placed. With respect to the same sequence of 
observations, as the level of confidence increases, the 
confidence interval obtained based on the sequence be­
comes wider. T hus the higher the level of confidence, 
the fewer ticket prices Conf would find attractive. It 
appeared that the lower confidence levels allowed for 
a better balance between the numbers of bets placed 
and declined. 
The last parameter, the priors of the beta distribu­
tion beta( a, b), affects only Bayes. It characterizes 
Bayes' initial bias on the probability of heads before 
it encounters any evidence. We only showed the re­
sults for four different priors in Table 5: (1, 1) is a fiat 
distribution; (11, 1) favors heads; (1, 11) favors tails; 
and (11, 11) favors an equal distribution of heads and 
tails. The priors increased the profit of Bayes when 
they closely matched the real chance of heads p. For 
example, at p = 0.1, (1, 11) performed the best and 
(11, 1) the worst, while at p = 0.9, the reverse held. 
At p = 0.5, both (1, 1) and (11, 11) performed well, 
with the latter being slightly better. 
Averaged over all settings of the chance of heads p, the 
uniform prior (1, 1) performed better than the other 
three priors. This supports the principle of indiffer­
ence: it is best not to assume a biased prior in the 
absence of good reasons. The gain from a matching 
prior is much less than the loss incurred when there is 
a mismatch. It is also interesting that in every case, 
including the ones in which the priors matched the 
real chance of heads, Conf performed better than both 
Bayes and Sample. 
7 More Thoughts 
Speaking generally, Sample and Bayes had compara­
ble performance, while Conf appeared to obtain higher 
returns in quite a few cases. Although Conf bet less 
often, on average the yield per actual bet was higher. 
However, the differences in performance could also 
partially be attributed to the way the experiment was 
set up. Sample and Bayes are always ready to bet, 
while Conf has to skip some of the trials if the ticket 
price falls within the bounds of its confidence interval. 
By imposing a limited number of tokens that could be 
used to place a bet, the playing field was somewhat lev­
elled so that all players would place an approximately 
equal number of bets. ( Conf might still place fewer 
bets if there were not enough "good" trials.) 
We can consider setting other rules for the game. Sup­
pose Conf is forced to bet? "Force" implies sanctions; 
sanctions imply value. The value involved in the sanc­
tion distorts the odds. The way to handle this is to 
allow Conf to refrain from buying and selling tickets, 
but to charge it a small penalty every time it exer­
cises this option. This will increase the number of bets 
placed by Conf, while retaining the choice to decline 
to bet if necessary. The effects of imposing a penalty 
might be similar to that of decreasing the level of con-
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fidence 1 - a in some cases, but it provides a more 
flexible way to manage the betting criterion. 
We have shown that the confidence interval approach 
can outperform the subjective Bayesian approach in 
quite a broad range of circumstances. It should be 
noted that this is not a question involving differences 
of parameters, as it would be if one approach were su­
perior when the actual relative frequency is close to 0, 
and the other were superior when the actual relative 
frequency is close to 0.5. The differences appear to 
be quite global. The results suggest that confidence 
methods, involving the acceptance or rejection of fam­
ilies of statistical hypotheses, can offer practical ad­
vantages over purely probabilistic methods. Not only 
do Bayesian methods require the assumption of a prior 
probability (often hard to justify), but there appears 
to be a practical difference in return between updat­
ing the "uninformative" prior by conditionalization, 
and updating (pruning) the set of possible distribu­
tions by the application of confidence methods at a 
certain level of confidence. This suggests that the role 
of acceptance is not that of providing a rough short­
hand for probabilistic updating, but more important 
and fundamental. 
Further work needs to be done to characterize more 
precisely the circumstances under which one approach 
is better than the other, by taking account of a more 
finely articulated Bayesian strategy. We should also be 
able to extend this method of performance measure to 
evaluate other approaches to uncertainty. 
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